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Identity Display: another motive for metalinguistic disagreement 
Alex Davies 
 
Forthcoming in Inquiry 
 
 
1 Linguistic Autonomy 
Two people metalinguistically disagree just in case they disagree about with which content 
a given word should be used (perhaps, in a particular context): one person believes that the 
content of the word should be one thing, another person believes that the content of the 
word should be another. They have this straightforward opposition in their beliefs. 
 
Expression, and continued pursuit, of metalinguistic disagreements can seem inherently 
unmotivated. For one might assume (as some have (e.g. (Bloomfield, 1933), (Lewis, 1969) 
and (Stenius, 1967)), that nothing bears upon how you should use a given word other than 
how other users of the same word are using it. The only aim that matters for deciding with 
which content to use a given expression is communication, and communication requires 
only that different users assign the same content to the same expressions. Let’s call this 
assumption “Linguistic Autonomy.” Linguistic Autonomy implies that if there is no 
agreement amongst users of the word about with which content to use it, then there just is 
no fact of the matter about with which content the word should be used, and so no point 
debating the issue. Interlocutors should just agree on an arbitrary assignment of content and 
get back to communicating effectively. They should not enter an extended argument about 
with which content to use the word. 
 
However, against Linguistic Autonomy, Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Plunkett and Sundell 
(forthcoming), Sundell (2016), and Sundell (2017) have provided compelling reason to 
believe that some metalinguistic disagreements are what they call “metalinguistic 
negotiations.” Roughly speaking, in metalinguistic negotiations, participants are motivated 
to pursue a metalinguistic disagreement by the fact that one or more outcomes (about which 
they care) of a given practical activity will be different depending upon with which content 
a word is used. They pursue the disagreement in order to reach consensus on the outcomes. 
 
The purpose of the current paper is to describe a further motivation (besides the drive to 
practically oriented consensus) for the pursuit of a metalinguistic dispute (section 3). The 
contents with which words are used are markers of the social identities of the persons using 
those words, and it is important to us that our social identities are seen and understood. 
Metalinguistic disagreement can function as a stage upon which to perform a contrast of 
social identities. This can make pursuit of metalinguistic disagreement both important and 
even enjoyable. 
 
As we will see, the characteristic profile of those metalinguistic disputes that are driven by 
the motive of displaying one’s identity can differ significantly from the profile of a 
metalinguistic negotiation (section 4). The difference between the motives for pursuing 
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metalinguistic disagreement expands the contextualist’s arsenal against the relativist about 
the semantics of predicates of personal taste (section 5). Acknowledgement of identity 
display as a motive for pursuing metalinguistic disagreement also permits us to deal a 
second blow to Linguistic Autonomy (section 6). 
 
2 Metalinguistic Negotiation 
Before we turn to identity display, let’s get clearly in view the phenomenon Plunkett and 
Sundell call “metalinguistic negotiation.” Consider a context-sensitive predicate. It can be 
used to communicate that a given object has or doesn't have a given property—provided 
that interlocutors know how the context fixes the content of the predicate i.e. which property 
is its content in the context. But things can also go the other way. Given common knowledge 
of the properties possessed by the object spoken of, interlocutors can use the predicate to 
communicate about the context. Here's an example (cf. (Barker, 2013, pp. 243-245), (Plunkett 
& Sundell, 2013, pp. 13-14), (Sundell, 2011, pp. 278-279)). Suppose that you and I both know 
how tall John is. But you're new around here and you don't know what people consider to 
be tall around here. So I try to communicate to you information about what counts as tall 
around here using John, by saying, “John’s tall.” Given that you know what John's height 
is, you learn, from my utterance, that the threshold for qualifying as tall around here is lower 
than that (i.e. John's height).  
 
Thus, with a context-sensitive expression applied to a given object, you can either use 
knowledge of the context to discern a property of the object, or you can use knowledge of 
the properties of the object to discern features of the context. The latter type of use of a 
context-sensitive expression is what Plunkett and Sundell call a “metalinguistic usage” of 
the expression. An exchange in which participants deploy metalinguistic usages of context-
sensitive expressions, thereby expressing disagreement about with which content to use 
those expressions, is what they call a “metalinguistic dispute.” 
 
Plunkett and Sundell (cf. (Plunkett and Sundell 2013, 14–15), (Sundell 2011, 279) and 
(Sundell 2016, 803)) distinguish between two kinds of metalinguistic dispute. Firstly, there 
are what they call descriptive metalinguistic disputes. The interlocutors dispute what the 
features of the context are as a matter of fact. Secondly, there are what they call normative 
metalinguistic disputes. Regardless of whether there is an existing conventional usage for 
the context (Sundell 2016, 804, fn13), the interlocutors take different views on with what 
content an expression should be employed in the context. Plunkett and Sundell (cf. (Plunkett 
and Sundell 2013, section 4.1), (Sundell 2016, 812–13), (Sundell 2017, 94-98)) take a stand on 
just why it is that interlocutors are motivated to pursue disagreements about with which 
content an expression should be employed (thereby opposing Linguistic Autonomy). When 
a word is used in a given practice, then differences in the content associated with that word 
are likely to lead the practice to have different consequences. Assuming that the word, for 
instance, “torture” is embedded in laws governing the activities of soldiers and government 
agents, depending upon exactly which content is assigned to “torture” when applying those 
laws, we'll end up with different consequences for these soldiers and agents: in particular, 
whether such people will be incarcerated or otherwise punished. If one cares about such 
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consequences, then one will care about which content is assigned to the word in the practice. 
As Plunkett and Sundell put the point: 
 
Given a certain social-historical setting—a setting in which certain words (largely 
independent of which specific concept they express) fill specific and important 
functional roles in our practices – participants might care a great deal (and genuinely 
substantive results could hang on) which concept/word pairings we employ in a 
given context. (Plunkett & Sundell, 2013, p. 20) 
 
The aim of a metalinguistic disagreement about with which content an expression should 
be used—as is particularly salient in Sundell's (2016 sections, 3 & 4)—is to coordinate the 
use of an expression by two persons (i.e. to ensure that both users use it with the same 
content). 
 
The phenomenon that Plunkett and Sundell call “metalinguistic negotiation” is then: 
metalinguistic disagreement about with which content a word should be used; which is 
pursued because the choice of content has practical consequences about which participants 
to the disagreement care; and finally, which is aimed at achieving consensus.1  
 
The phenomenon is not restricted to terms (like “torture”) that figure in legal texts. What’s 
required to set up the possibility of metalinguistic negotiation is that a sentence be used in 
a context whose outcome is contingent upon the truth of the sentence. In that case, 
differences to the content of the words in the sentence can affect its truth, and consequently 
that outcome. For instance, you’re making chilli con carne (Plunkett & Sundell, 2013, pp. 14-
15). Comments about the level of chilli in the con carne will be used, in the course of cooking, 
to guide the amount of chilli in the con carne. The amount included has consequences about 
which those cooking care. A metalinguistic negotiation could well take place. But no legal 
texts need be in sight. 
 
The existence of this breed of metalinguistic disagreement (embedded in such a 
motivational structure) is, thanks to Plunkett and Sundell, now quite uncontroversial. As I 
say, the current paper describes the contours of a rather different kind of metalinguistic 
disagreement (embedded in quite a different motivational structure). 
 
3 Identity Display 
Identity display through metalinguistic disagreement is a special case of giving off 
                                                 
1 There are passages wherein Sundell shows a willingness to classify a broader range of circumstances under 
the label “metalinguistic negotiation.” See especially (Sundell, 2016, p. 805)  and (Sundell, 2017). Nonetheless 
despite such passages, Sundell's focus on metalinguistic negotiation as described above is explicit, persistent 
and has clearly affected how his work is received. When he sets to work trying to convince his readers that 
language users can have intense motivations to argue the toss over how a bit of language is to be used, he 
repeatedly does so by belabouring differences in practical consequences that depend upon with which content 
that bit of language is used. Indeed, the choice of the word “negotiation” to describe what could motivate 
interlocutors to pursue a metalinguistic dispute focuses our attention squarely upon processes that are aimed 
at achieving consensus. 
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information through the way one performs an action in the presence of others. In order to 
make the nature of identity display more fully apparent, I first describe this more general 
phenomenon. I then describe how identity display can be done specifically through the use 
of polysemous or context-sensitive words in ways that parallel the general case. Finally, I 
explain why metalinguistic disagreement is an especially good conversational environment 
in which to do identity display through the use of polysemous or context-sensitive words. 
 
3.1 Giving information and giving off information 
We take ourselves to be certain kinds of person and the kinds of people there are to be are 
(to a great degree) distinguished not just by immutable traits of biology, brain and body-
type, but by distinctive patterns of behaviour. Alluding to a study of conduct in 1940s USA 
(viz. (Komarovsky, 1946)), Erving Goffman, that great ‘metaphysician of the banal’ (Berger, 
1986, p. xi),  writes: 
 
…when we observe a young American middle-class girl playing dumb for the benefit 
of her boy friend [sic], we are ready to point to items of guile and contrivance in her 
behaviour. But like herself and her boy friend [sic], we accept as an unperformed fact 
that this performer is a young American middle-class girl. But surely here we neglect 
the greater part of the performance. (Goffman, 1969, p. 81) 
 
We don’t have to be radical social constructivists in order to accept the importance of our 
conduct for our placement amongst social categories. Instead, just think for a moment about 
how one recognizes a person as a valley girl, a riot grrrl, a member of the nouveau riche, a 
rebel, a narcissist, a “dick”, a creepy professor, a person “with an edge”, a criminal, or 
indeed, an American middle-class girl—not, typically, by consulting government data. But 
instead, simply by registering the impressions created by the person through how he or she 
holds him or herself in particular situations. 
 
Moreover, we care about our location amongst social categories. One cares about whether 
one is a rebel, a narcissist, a “dick” etc. But then, if we care about our location amongst these 
categories, and if membership of these categories is to a great degree a matter of conduct, 
then we have a strong motivation to regulate our conduct in such a way as to take control 
of our location amongst these categories. Borrowing a term from Hample and Irions (2015), 
I will call the management of the impressions we make upon others for the sake of 
controlling our location amongst social categories of persons “identity display.” 
 
How do we do identity display? Toward the beginning of his The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life Goffman draws the following distinction between two means by which an 
individual may communicate with those around him. 
 
The expressiveness of the individual (and therefore his capacity to give impressions) 
appears to involve two radically different kinds of sign activity: the expression that 
he gives, and the expression that he gives off. The first involves verbal symbols or their 
substitutes which he uses admittedly and solely to convey the information that he 
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and the others are known to attach to these symbols. This is communication in the 
traditional and narrow sense. The second involves a wide range of action that others 
can treat as symptomatic of the actor, the expectation being that the action was 
performed for reasons other than the information conveyed in this way. (Goffman, 
1969, p. 14) 
 
When communication gets discussed by philosophers of language, the lion’s share of 
discussion is about the first kind of ‘sign activity’: a particular action is performed with the 
intention of getting someone to form a particular belief by recognizing the intention. These 
are acts which have Grice’s (1957) non-natural meaning. We, for instance, tell each other 
things. Needless to say, this method does not seem to be the predominant means by which 
others discern our location amongst social categories. The second kind of ‘sign activity’ is 
the wielding of Grice’s natural meaning for the purposes of communication. This kind of 
thing does seem like the more likely candidate for the predominant way in which others 
discern which social categories we fall into. However, the very idea that one can exercise 
control over this second kind of ‘sign activity’ can seem a little paradoxical (as Goffman 
(1969, pp. 76-82, pp. 241-244) was wont to stress). It can seem this way because the presence 
of the wrong kind of intention destroys natural meaning (for discussion see (Moran, 2005) 
and (Ross, 1986)). For instance: the new secretary’s repeated sniffing, the scratching of his 
nose, his abruptly improved mood, and the sudden absence of the sweats may well mean 
that his recent “bathroom break” included the snorting of cocaine—that he is a cocaine user. 
But if it turns out that these changes are all components of a concerted performance given 
to us specifically with the intention of getting us to believe that he has just snorted cocaine, 
then his actions do not mean he is a cocaine user. The secretary’s actions can mean he is a 
cocaine user in the same way that the spots can mean measles (a case of Grice’s (1957) 
natural meaning), but only if the actions haven’t been done with the express intention of 
getting us to believe that he is a cocaine user. If those actions were performed with such an 
intention, then we have to engage in an assessment for which we would otherwise have no 
need: namely, of why he would want us to think he is a cocaine user. 
 
Nonetheless, none of this means that actions cannot be performed with the intention of 
communicating the actions’ natural meanings. Although that intention cannot be the overt 
intention with which one performs the actions, actions performed in ways that at least create 
the impression that they are being performed for other reasons can be performed with 
different (so to say) inflections, which affect the visibility of the natural meanings of the 
action performed: one can bring into focus (both in the sense of bringing to attention and of 
making less fuzzy) the actions performed, and consequently what those actions mean for 
one’s location amongst social categories. These are ways of, in principle, deliberately doing 
identity display through the second kind of ‘sign activity’. Borrowing from Goffman, I will 
now describe four of these ways. 
 
First, what is done may be to some extent dramatized: i.e. given extra flourishes which make 
it more apparent what is taking place. For instance, Goffman (1969, p. 41) describes how a 
nurse doing rounds making observations of patients may seem to those around her to be 
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someone who is just having a chat—doing nothing medically important. The nurse may 
however exaggerate aspects of her examination in order to make it apparent that an 
examination is being performed, even though, strictly speaking, these exaggerations are not 
necessary to get the information that it is the purpose of the examination to retrieve. 
 
Second, one may perform actions in a manner that fits the stereotypes and presumptions 
others have of you or your social kind in order not to distract and complicate the appearance 
of the action that one is performing—one makes one’s action conform to the ideals of those 
watching it, so as not to raise questions, queries and distractions that take attention away 
from the action that one is performing. Here is another one of Goffman’s examples. There is 
the ‘ignorant, shiftless, happy-go-lucky manner’ which African-Americans in the southern 
states of the U.S. in the past have ‘felt obliged to affect during interaction with whites’ 
(Goffman, 1969, p. 47). The idea being that if an African-American did not impute this into, 
for example, his buying of groceries, then it would disrupt the action of buying groceries in 
a store owned by a white man: to the white man it wouldn’t look like an uncontroversial 
case of someone buying groceries. It would look like someone being confrontational. 
Although this would of course be a mistake on the part of the owner, if the African-
American just wants to be seen as a man buying his groceries (nothing more, nothing less) 
without turning the exchange into a site of resistance, then he can conform to the stereotype 
to keep the exchange normal in the eyes of the owner. 
 
Third, minor flaws which themselves do nothing to undermine the performance of an act 
vis a vis the achievement of a desired practical outcome, might nonetheless cause an 
audience to lose confidence in a given interpretation of what is taking place. For this reason, 
we seek as much as possible to avoid these minor flaws: an untucked shirt in a business 
meeting; a skirt stuck in a belt; a stutter; a mispronounced word; a stumble; a gesture that 
looks like something else etc. Such things don’t necessarily make the doing of a given action 
worse (as measured by the achievement of a certain practical outcome), but if present, can 
thwart the clarity of the activity taking place by undermining confidence in a given 
interpretation of what is happening. We’re aware of this, which is why doing something (e.g. 
building something, cooking something) can suddenly feel more stressful when someone 
who may well be sceptical about what is taking place begins to watch. 
 
Fourth, impressions given off by actions done before others are often given off in virtue of 
concerted behaviour amongst several persons. One can make one’s action obviously have the 
distinctive contours of a person buying a loaf of bread in a shop only if there is another 
person present discernibly doing the action of selling one the bread—otherwise it can begin 
to look like theft. This can have the effect that one is concerned with whom one is seen and 
their behaviour because the impression one creates will be in part a function of how others 
present their own actions. Suppose, for instance, that you sit in a bar attempting 
conversation about the politics of sex work, at one point citing a conversation you once had 
with a sex worker, which has informed your views about the selling of sex to this day. 
However, the impression that this is a political discussion is destroyed when your 
interlocutor begins expressing a prurient interest in the looks and services offered by the 
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aforementioned sex worker: “was she high class?” he asks loudly, a grin on his face. The 
conversation’s appearance now risks an inversion: looking like one between two “punters” 
comparing sex workers whose services they’re used to buying. The risks that others’ 
behaviour poses to the look of one’s own actions can require corrective measures (e.g. loud 
correction of the acquaintance with the prurient interest). It can even lead one to avoid being 
seen with persons who are liabilities in this respect. 
 
All of these ways of inflecting one’s actions in the presence of others are tools for identity 
display because the actions one performs are the basis for others’ inferences about the kind 
of person one is, and the inflections affect the visibility and clarity of those actions. 
 
3.2 Words, Criteria and Group Membership 
Let’s turn our attention to our special case: the doing of identity display through how we 
use our words. Kate McFarland makes the following observation: 
 
Speakers might identify as a member of a certain cultural heritage or subculture, or 
even as a person with certain idiosyncratic traits—and these facets of their identity 
can be reflected in the criteria by which they apply their words. (McFarland, 2015, p. 
147) 
 
The claim here is not that particular words are associated with particular identities—though 
a person’s capacity to switch dialect and register in order to promote one identity over 
another in different contexts inclines me to think that this is also true. The claim McFarland 
is rather making, and which we’re going to develop in what follows, is that when a word is 
context-sensitive or polysemous, and so permits use with one of several criteria, the choice 
of criterion adopted when using the word can mean that the user of the word falls within a 
given social category. I give four examples of such connections between word application 
criteria and social group membership. 
 
Consider first a discussion by the sociologist (and student of Goffman) Harvey Sacks on 
what he calls the “revolutionary” category of the hotrodder. Hotrodders—as Sacks speaks of 
them—are persons from 1950s USA who modified their cars in various different, but 
observable, ways (for an overview of the sub-culture see (Balsley, 1950). If you've ever seen 
American Graffiti then you know what I'm talking about. While lecturing on the features of 
a transcript of a group of hotrodders in a counselling session that took place in the 1950s, 
Sacks (1992) proposes that the category hotrodder has the following features. It is such that 
members of the category have authority over who is a member of the category. This is 
because membership of the category requires that one knows how to assess car 
modifications in accordance with the standards of the hotrodder category: 
 
The modification characteristics have some rather usual features for such kinds of 
categories, and that is, anybody can tell it's a hotrod, but it is members who can tell 
if it's a good one or a bad one, what rank it has, etc. (Sacks, 1992, p. 173) 
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Now if it's the case that what goes into deciding the rank of a hotrod is something 
that kids decide, then one can at least begin to see how it is that they're able to set up, 
and what are the kinds of things they would use to set up, machinery for social 
control over candidate members. That is, one is a member by recognition of others 
who are members. And thereby, to successfully get membership, you have to do what 
it is that they provide is the way to become a member. You don't ask your parents for 
permission, and then treat that as your entry card. Nor is it something you can do 
without a very considerable commitment. It is not something that you can do on an 
occasion, in any given apparatus. (Sacks, 1992, p. 174) 
 
Suppose you engage in a conversation with hotrodders about the relative merits of different 
hotrods. If you use terms of assessment (e.g. “good”) in application to the hotrods 
recognizably with criteria that are not the criteria that hotrodders use, then it will become 
apparent to the hotrodders present that you are not a hotrodder. 
 
Consider, second, music categories. There are those who will insist that only a very narrow 
range of bands qualify as falling into the category industrial. Bands such as Nine Inch Nails 
do not qualify. But others might be quite happy to place Nine Inch Nails in the category 
industrial. Persons who differ in these ways fall into different social groups: “purists” and 
“non-purists”, we might call them. Maintaining one's membership in the purist group 
comes with the need to deploy labels for denoting industrial music (in English “industrial”) 
in a certain way (for discussion see McFarland (2015, p. 147)). Similar remarks apply to the 
use of labels of other music categories: black metal, prog and country. For each there is a 
musician or group (Dimmu Borgir, Styx, Taylor Swift) such that purists of the category will 
not count it as a member whereas those who are not purists, will be happy to count it as a 
member. Membership of the purist group is tied to the use of music category terms in 
appropriate ways. Again: walk into a conversation amongst a bunch of (English speaking) 
purists, and call Nine Inch Nails “industrial”, and they’ll know you’re not a purist. 
 
Third, consider the application of aesthetic predicates to food items. According to a popular 
conception of persons and food, what food one eats is related to the kind of person one is 
(e.g. (Ahlgren, Gustafsson, & Hall, 2004), (Amiraian & Sobal, 2009), (Stein & Nemeroff, 1995), 
(Vartanian, Herman, & Polivy, 2007)). For this reason, terms of food classification can be 
used to indicate something about one’s location amongst social categories. A person who 
insists on classifying ready-made meals and late-night kebabs as not tasty, may use “tasty” 
with a content on which those items really do not fall within the word’s extension. She may 
do this, in part, to present herself as a healthy person. Yet, another person may use “tasty” 
with a content on which those items really do fall within the word’s extension, in part, in an 
effort to project an easy-going and playful persona—a person who’s not snooty about food. 
 
Fourth, and finally, it has been documented that people change their interpretation of 
politically significant sentences depending upon both which groups they think agree with 
those sentences and whether or not those people identify with the groups in question. For 
example, speaking of previous work upon which they build by Asch ( (1940), (1948)), Wood 
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et al. (1996) report the following example from Asch's work: 
 
...Asch's (1940, 1948) Gestalt analysis, in which source groups do not directly impact 
recipients' attitudes but instead alter recipients' understanding of the object or issue 
under discussion. For example, when participants were informed that Karl Marx 
authored the statement “Those who hold and those who are without property have 
ever formed two distinct classes,” they were relatively unfavorable toward it (Asch, 
1948), presumably because it was interpreted as communistic rhetoric, inciting 
rebellion and revolution. However, when respondents learned the true author was 
John Adams, they were more favorable, presumably because the statement then 
appeared to be part of capitalist ideology. Thus, “positions imputed to congenial 
groups produce changes in the meaning of the objects of judgment” (Asch, 1940, 
p.462). (Wood, Pool, & Purvis, 1996, p. 968) 
 
What Asch found is not just that people reinterpret a sentence based upon their background 
knowledge of the group of people who say it. That would be unsurprising: if a sentence is 
ambiguous, but X said it, and people like X would probably mean p by uttering the sentence, 
then in all likelihood, X was saying that p. The point is rather that people are more likely to 
engage in reinterpretation if they don't want to affiliate with that group of people. Their 
desire to disaffiliate with the group motivates them to assign content to the sentence that 
allows them to disagree with it, and hence the group from which they want to disaffiliate. 
Pool et al. (1998) replicated Asch's finding for other sentences. For instance, “Economic 
prosperity in Texas is dependent on Mexico” could be understood to be a description of the 
purported fact that Texas exploits illegal migrant workers from Mexico, or it could be 
understood to be a description of the purported fact that there are trade agreements between 
Mexico and the US such as NAFTA. Interpreters would change their interpretation of the 
target sentence, depending upon both who they were told said it and whether or not their 
self-esteem was tied to distinguishing themselves from that group. This is indicative of 
another substantial connection between how people are willing to use words and where 
amongst social categories these people fall. 
 
3.3 Identity Display using words with given contents 
Let’s put the observations of sections 3.1 and 3.2 together. Although, as we saw in section 
3.2, the content with which one uses an expression can be used to place oneself in a given 
social category, the content with which one uses a given word may not be immediately 
apparent. Just as Goffman’s nurse may have trouble making clear that she is engaged in an 
examination of a patient because the activity itself isn’t inherently distinguishable from a 
mere chat, the application of “good hotrod”, “country music”, “dependent on Mexico”, or 
“tasty” to an uncontroversial exemplar of the category may do very little to make 
recognizable that you’re using the relevant expression with one content rather than another. 
However, the four techniques described in section 3.1 for inflecting an action to make its 
appearance unequivocal have application to the use of words with given contents. 
 
Firstly, there are ways to make more apparent that one is using a word with one rather than 
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another content. One can find objects which clearly distinguish two possible contents of a 
given word and one can make clear which side of the extensional border one places the 
object. If one also makes clear that one is well informed about the properties of this object, 
then by applying the word (or a phrase with the word’s complement as its extension) to this 
object, one makes most obvious with what content one is using the word. For instance, you 
prove that you are well acquainted with Taylor Swift’s music by citing features of the music 
that only someone who has listened to it carefully could know yet, even so, you brazenly 
apply “country music” to it. Given your demonstrated knowledge of her music, your 
application unequivocally shows that you’re using “country music” with a criterion that 
permits inclusion of Swift’s music within the extension of “country music.” Similarly, for a 
mere fenderless jalopy and “good hotrod”, a late-night kebab and “tasty”, and details of the 
damage that sudden removal of illegal Mexican migrants from Texas would have on the 
state’s economy and “dependent on Mexico.” 
 
Secondly, one may, in speaking, conform to broader social norms and stereotypes, in order 
not to distract from a particular use one is making of the relevant expression. For instance, 
you may be really rather taken by your dad’s very subtle adjustments to his own car. If those 
adjustments had been made by a teenager, the result would unproblematically be 
considered a good hotrod. But you may know hotrodders have biases against older 
persons—especially parents. So you don’t ever apply the expression “good hotrod” to your 
dad’s car, because it’ll complicate how you’re understood when you apply the expression 
to other cars. You may avoid even praising Nine Inch Nails (let alone classifying them as 
industrial) when in the company of purists, for fear that this will raise suspicions that when 
you use “industrial” you are employing a content that could encompass Nine Inch Nails. 
 
Thirdly, in an obvious way, minor flaws in the application of a term may cast doubt upon 
whether one is really using a given expression with the particular content one wants to be 
seen to be applying the expression with. You have a momentary slip in classifying a car you 
didn’t examine very carefully, but which definitely doesn’t (even by your own lights) 
qualify as a good hotrod: you apply “good hotrod” to it. Although you quickly retract your 
claim, the damage may already have been done to others’ confidence in your hotrodder 
status, because doubts have been raised about your ability to use terms with the aesthetic 
criteria characteristic of hotrodders. 
 
Fourthly, whereas a conversation may provide an opportunity to use a given word with 
one’s favoured content, some conversations are going to be structured in such a way as to 
afford more opportunities to demonstrate the word’s use with one’s favoured content than 
other conversations. Consider expressions of disagreement. Public disagreements (be they 
metalinguistic or not) are in any case a way of showing one’s identity through a public 
defence of one’s view—which itself is likely to locate one in some region of social space. As 
anthropologist Julie Lindquist notes in her study of argument in a Chicago bar, the 
expression of disagreements, which everyone knows there's no hope of ever resolving (e.g. 
(Lindquist, 2002, p. 153)), can nonetheless be used to act out differences. Thus: 
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In argument, Jack can persuade others (and himself) that he's not a supercilious 
egghead, like me; I can demonstrate that I'm not a small-minded reactionary, like him. 
(Lindquist, 2002, p. 172) 
 
One can show who one is through a method of contrast using disagreement. When the 
disagreement is on a matter which permits repeated applications of a given word, as well 
as the explicit drawing of inferences which display the truth-conditional content of the word 
as one is using it, disagreement can be an especially good conversational genre for identity 
display through the criteria with which one uses one’s words. 
 
There are three identities that may be displayed through expression of disagreement (and 
consequently through expression of metalinguistic disagreement), the expression of each of 
which may serve as a motive for extended expression of the disagreement. Firstly, and most 
obviously, one may pursue the disagreement to show something about oneself. One does 
that by taking opportunities in the disagreement to make recognizable one’s use of a word 
with a content that is an indicator of given group memberships. Secondly, one may also 
pursue the disagreement to give someone else a chance—wittingly or not—to showcase 
aspects of their identity. For example, a person may wish to showcase that a man eager to 
be seen as a feminist ally through his insistence that sexual harassment and sexual assault 
are common yet widely unacknowledged, has nonetheless repeatedly ‘denied, minimized, 
trivialized, eroticized, or excepted as marginal or episodic’ (MacKinnon, 1989, pp. 5-6) nigh 
on all such events: i.e. he tends to use the words “sexual harassment” and “sexual assault” 
with contents that are gerrymandered to ensure that most events he ever explicitly considers 
fail to fall squarely within their extension. You want others to see—what you have known 
for a while, but others have refused to acknowledge—that this self-professed feminist is 
problematic. You may thereby use metalinguistic disagreement as the rope with which he 
may hang himself. Thirdly, there may be an identity that all parties to a disagreement have 
in common and which would be displayed in having the disagreement. The having of the 
disagreement may be a way of performing that shared identity. This too may motivate 
metalinguistic disagreement. Two young men sit in a student union bar attempting to leave 
the impression on others in the bar that, let’s say, they are promising philosophers of the 
future. They may do this by together pursuing a metalinguistic disagreement that 
showcases their ability to make fine rhetorically compelling distinctions, to not get sucked 
into the slanted terms of his opponent, etc. 
 
4 Five features of expressions of metalinguistic disagreement motivated by identity-
display 
Now we have a clear idea of what the use of metalinguistic disagreement to display identity 
is, let’s take a step back, and note five features of such disagreements. In the process, we will 
see some significant differences between them and metalinguistic negotiation. 
 
First, and most obviously, these disagreements are not aimed at consensus. Consequently, 
expressions of metalinguistic disagreement can be satisfying and fulfil their purpose if 
motivated by identity display even if everyone knows consensus is not in the offing. This 
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contrasts with metalinguistic negotiations. Since the aim of such negotiations is consensus, 
if consensus is known to be unlikely, the expression of this kind of metalinguistic 
disagreement is with little point. 
 
Second, recall that, as we noted earlier, the lion’s share of philosophers’ talk about 
communication focuses upon acts performed with the express intention of getting the 
audience to do something by recognizing this very intention. Saying, just as much as 
implicating, something are commonly supposed to be linguistic acts of this kind. In recent 
work, speech acts which communicate metalinguistic information have been taken to 
communicate that information in just this way. Although Plunkett and Sundell (2013, pp. 15, 
fn42) remain officially neutral on the precise mechanisms by which metalinguistic 
information is communicated, their concern is with acts of advocation performed by using 
words with given contents (ibid). If one uses a word with a given content with the intention 
of advocating its usage, recognition of this intention must surely be part of what is required 
for the act of advocation to succeed: otherwise the use is just a use, left for observers to make 
of it what they will. Two other philosophers whose recent work is about metalinguistic acts 
are entirely explicit in their assumption that the actions they describe require recognition of 
a communicative intention in order to be successful. Firstly, Hansen (forthcoming, p. 2) 
defines a metalinguistic proposal as a special case of an advisory speech act: a speech act 
which expresses ‘the belief that doing some action is a good idea, that it is in the hearer’s 
interest’ and the speaker’s ‘intention that H [the hearer] take this belief of [the speaker’s] as 
a reason to act’.‘ The speaker’s intention in uttering the sentence that underlies the act’s 
performance is thus supposed to be recognized. Secondly, Sterken (2019) describes the 
intentional use of a word with a meaning one wants the word to be used with, knowing that 
in the context of the conversation one’s use may well not get recognized. Nonetheless, the 
act of interest to Sterken involves what she calls a ‘diachronic communicative intention’: an 
intention that the use, and its point, get recognized, even if only after the close of the 
conversation in which the act is performed. 
 
All of this contrasts with the activity of displaying one’s identity through the use of a word 
with a given content. Identity display doesn’t work by getting others to recognize one’s 
intention to get them to believe one has a certain identity. On the contrary, as we discussed 
in section 3.1, recognition of that intention is likely to damage the effectiveness with which 
one communicates that one has the relevant identity. For most acts which constitute the 
performing of an identity, it must at least look as though they are being performed in pursuit 
of some other purpose besides displaying the identity—namely, for a purpose that someone 
with that identity would have. Identity display—although something one can do through 
metalinguistic disagreement—is very much a kind of action that philosophers of language 
have historically neglected. 
 
Third, identity display need not be deliberate. There are plenty of skilful actions, which we 
perform unthinkingly. Think for instance, of the distance one maintains from others in an 
elevator (Rietveld, 2008). If the elevator is spacious, and there’s but one other person inside 
it, you neither stand so close that you’re touching that person nor pressure yourself into the 
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corner of the elevator as you might were it crammed full of people. You may think through 
exactly where to stand, and so stand where you do deliberately. But in many cases you 
won’t. Your conscious mind will be on something else. And if someone asked you what you 
were doing, you probably would not say (without further questioning) that you were 
maintaining appropriate distance from the other person in the elevator: your answer would 
pertain to taking the elevator to floor X, or to your goal in taking the elevator to floor X. 
Nonetheless, where you stand in the elevator is a (social) skill. If you do stand too close, or 
too far, you will make an impression that is perhaps not what you want: creepy, weird, odd. 
Which is precisely why there are times when some of us are prone to overthink these 
normally unthinking acts. The use of a word with a given content is similar. As we navigate 
the use of context-sensitive and polysemous words in different contexts, for the most part, 
we aren’t deliberating about which are the best contents to use with such words. We rather 
adapt our uses unthinkingly. Of course, there are moments when we do explicitly deliberate 
about this. But they are the exceptions that prove the rule. One may well be motivated to 
adopt unthinkingly certain word-content pairings by the impressions one thereby makes, 
because one is skilled at doing so: just as one may be motivated to stand where one does in 
the elevator because of the impressions one makes on others, even if one is so skilled at this 
that most of the time one doesn’t think about how to do it. 
 
Fourth, one doesn’t need an audience in order to engage in identity display through how 
one pairs contents with words (Goffman, 1969, p. 87). If it’s important to one to be a 
gentleman, then one may well maintain the patterns of conduct of a gentleman even when 
no one’s watching. There’s nothing paradoxical about that. And the same applies to the use 
of words with given contents. If a hotrodder is on his own thinking about cars, he 
nonetheless has ample reason, given his commitment to that identity, to use terms of 
assessment in the hotrodder way. 
 
Fifth, of course, situations can arise in which a person is driven in the content with which 
they use a word by both practical/consequentialist and identity display motives. In some 
circumstances those motives may collide: e.g. you are met with the practical challenge of 
directing a friend to the aisle where they can find the Nine Inch Nails records (the industrial 
section), and at the same time, maintaining your purist credentials, which dictate that you 
don’t classify Nine Inch Nails as industrial. But alternatively, they may dovetail: as would 
happen if you were met with the same situation, but you’re no purist. One should expect 
there to be a spectrum of contexts ranging from the purely practical to pure identity display 
cases, and one would expect that most real contexts fall in the middle of this spectrum. For 
instance, in Fine’s (1992) detailed study of the factors guiding restaurant-working chefs’ 
aesthetic judgements about the meals they compose, the motivating factors were a mixture 
of existential concerns about artisan identity and other concerns about profit making 
(pleasing the client). 
 
5 A Response to An Objection to the Contextualist 
On the contextualist analysis of the semantics of predicates of personal taste, the content of 
the predicate may be different for different participants to a disagreement. The notorious 
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explanatory challenge contextualists then face is how it is that a state of disagreement can 
be being expressed when each party to the purported disagreement is using the same word 
with a different content: as when, for instance, A says, “Paul Foot is hilarious” and B 
responds, “No, Paul Foot is not hilarious”, each using “hilarious” with a different content. 
One explanatory strategy that has been pursued by Plunkett and Sundell now for several 
years is to propose that in cases where disagreements are definitely present while the 
content of, for instance, “hilarious” diverges between participants, we are witnessing a 
metalinguistic negotiation. 
 
One objection to this explanatory strategy has been the possibility of disagreements on 
matters of personal taste wherein the accoutrements of metalinguistic negotiation are absent: 
there is no broader activity whose outcome is importantly dependent upon the choice of 
content for a word in the current exchange (see (Marques, 2017), (Zeman, 2016) and (Zeman, 
2017)). It is perfectly possible to apply aesthetic adjectives like “beautiful” to an object 
without at all being aware of any features of a conversational context that could introduce 
momentous consequences to some practical outcome about which one cares. It’s possible 
for one person to express her judgement that a statue is beautiful, while another person 
expresses her judgement that a statue is not beautiful, and for the two to be in a state of 
disagreement about whether the statue is beautiful without either being aware of any 
(further) conversational context, and consequently without there being need of any practical 
consequences which hinge upon with which content precisely “beautiful” is used (nor 
correspondingly, upon which content appears in the judgements these persons hold). 
 
This objection does not (successfully) target Plunkett and Sundell’s account of the state of 
disagreement in the cases of interest: viz. that it is metalinguistic (for Plunkett and Sundell’s 
response to just such an objection see (Plunkett & Sundell, forthcoming)). For the absence of 
conversational context in no way implies that persons cannot disagree about with which 
content the word “beautiful” should be employed. If the objection (successfully) targets 
anything, it’s the motivation for expressing and pursuing such a disagreement. It draws 
attention to circumstances in which the stuff that, according to Plunkett and Sundell, makes 
expression and pursuit of metalinguistic disagreement a reasonable thing to do, is absent. 
 
However, if we acknowledge identity display as a motive for expression of metalinguistic 
disagreement, and recall that the active presence of such a motive does not need the 
accoutrements of metalinguistic negotiation, then the objection loses whatever teeth it had. 
For the objection to continue to be compelling, despite the constant possibility of identity 
display, one would need not just to point to contexts in which disagreement is witnessed in 
the absence of any broader practical activity of the right kind, but to contexts in which 
persons are not driven by a desire to display, or a habit of displaying, their identities. Given 
that we are all so very human in this respect, that kind of context seems like it’ll be a hard 
thing to find—especially given that, as we noted in section 4, identity display requires 
neither deliberation nor an audience. 
  
6 Another blow against Linguistic Autonomy 
15 
Recall what I earlier referred to as Linguistic Autonomy: nothing bears upon how you 
should use a given word other than how other users of the same word are using it. Language 
users are practical agents, guided by reasons and habit. Setting aside limitations of 
performance, we are to imagine that the only factors that guide these practical agents in the 
use they make of expressions from their shared language is how other members of the same 
linguistic community are using those expressions. Plunkett and Sundell have already dealt 
one blow against Linguistic Autonomy. The practical consequences that word-content 
assignments will have in a context can be reasons for or against particular word-content 
assignments, reasons which are not just a matter of what assignments others in the 
community are adopting.  
 
We can now deal Linguistic Autonomy a second blow. For the deployment of certain 
contents rather than others is a way of locating oneself amongst social categories. Persons 
concerned about their location in social space will be motivated to prefer certain word-
assignment combinations over others. Just as with the practical consequences of word-
content assignments in a context, this can lead different members of the same linguistic 
community to fiercely diverge in their assignments of contents to given words—and not just 
in how they themselves want their own words to be understood, but in how they 
understand others’ words. Recall, for instance, the findings by Asch ( (1940), (1948)), Pool et 
al. (1998) and Wood et al. (1996) reported in section 3.2: if my self-esteem will drop if I find 
out that I agree with members of a group from which I strongly disaffiliate, then in defence 
of my self-esteem, if I find a sentence with which members of this group agree, I am likely 
to unthinkingly seek out interpretations of the sentence that allow me to more easily 
disagree with it. 
 
If identity display is a perennial concern for language users, then failures of linguistic 
autonomy are the norm. And if that’s right, it is then quite possible that we are normally 
faced with circumstances in which we are motivated to diverge in the criteria with which 
we use (including, in how we interpret others’ uses of) the words of a shared language. 
Despite it not being conducive to successful overt communication, speakers might normally 
face motivation to (seemingly) wilfully misunderstand one another (Pohlhaus, 2012). A 
theory of overt communication would then have to describe what needs to be in place in 
order to avoid this kind of predicament not as a marginal phenomenon, but as something 
central. Most appeals to theories of overt communication do not proceed in such a manner 
(e.g. (Carston, 2002), (Neale, 2005), (Predelli, 2010), (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), (Stanley, 2007)). 
Their communication takes place in a social vacuum. But if linguistic autonomy is false, 
perhaps that should change. 
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